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Ki;iMI|'.l.lC OF VII'T-NAM 




Saigon, July 1964 

IJKI'lllil.lC OF; VIET- NAM 





Saigon, July 1964 


Introduction : The determination of the Republic of Viet- 
Nam to fight until victory has been won against 
Communist aggression l 

Evidence : Evidence of the Communist aggression against 

the Republic of Viet-Nam 9 

Annexes : The 34 annexes referred to in this volume 
comprise the texts of statements and memoranda of 
the government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, as well 
as letters to the Secretariat General of the Inter- 
national Control Commission from the Vietnamese 
Liaison Mission in protest at Viet-Cong machinations 
of the 1954 Geneva Agreement. 

These annexes are not included in this present 
book, which is an abridged version of the White 
Book and intended for a wider public. Those readers 
requiring a more complete documentation are 
requested to consult the White Book itself and the 
Annexes to it. 

A further publication will shortly be issued to 
illustrate how, despite Communist aggression, the 
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has already 
achieved substantial results in the execution of its 
social and economic policies. 


«a<v vim > i«.-> I i *, 




Ten years after the Geneva Agreement of 1954, Communist 
aggression in South-East Asia is once again an acute problem. The 
attention of the world's capitals is turning now towards this 
strategic area and, with the future of world peace in mind, the 
question is being asked whether the peoples of Viet-Nam and Laos 
are about to fall victim to the grasp of Communist imperialism. 

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam is well aware 
of the key role of Viet-Nam in South-East Asia in the face of this 
danger to world peace, \ 

« The war in Viet-Nam is Asia's final battle » was the 
emphatic statement made by Dr. Phan-huy-Quat, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam when he spoke in 
Washington on June 4th, 1964. « Should misfortune decide that 
the Free World lose this battle, such last bastions as India and 
Japan would retain little strategic value. Trouble spots will spring 
up and spread rapidly even on the American continent itself. » 

This sombre assessment indicates the supreme importance 
which the government of the Republic of Viet-Nam attaches to 
the struggle in which it is now locked against Communist aggres- 
sion and in which not only the freedom and national independence 
of Viet-Nam are at stake but also the peace and stability of the Free 
World in the South-East Asian area. It is furthermore an appeal 
to international vigilance in the face of the bad faith and per- 
fidiousness of the Communist imperialists for whom treaties and 
international agreements are but scraps of paper, valueless except 
where they can be made to serve Communist interests. 

Hostilities have never ceased in Viet-Nam 

Striking examples of this are the flagrant and continuous 
violations by North Viet-Nam of the Geneva Agreement of 1954 
which set the seal on the war in Indo-China. 

Ten years ago the Communists of North Viet-Nam solemnly 
signed these Agreements accepting thereby the partition of Viet- 


Nam and imposing the heavy yoke of red imperialism on half 
the population. 

Hostilities in Viet-Nam have not ceased at any time since 
1954. In fact, the Communists have all along maintained a state 
of clandestine war and now there is open aggression against Free 
Viet-Nam and its people, very seriously threatening the peace 
of the area. 

Throughout the last ten years the Communists in Hanoi have 
given increasingly flagrant proof of their treason to the national 

Communist aggression 

Trampling under foot the solemn agreements which they 
signed at Geneva, the « controllers » in Hanoi have fomented, 
directed and ceaselessly supported an immense campaign of sub- 
version against the Republic of Viet-Nam and its population. In 
this they have always been directly aided by the other Communist 
countries, particularly Communist China. 

This campaign is, of course, chairacterised neither by an open 
declaration of war, a territorial invasion, nor a frontal attack by 
a uniformed army ; neither by a naval blockade nor aerial bombing 
by an enemy from outside. It is of a type far more dangerous 
than all these — sometimes insidious, sometimes violent ; some- 
times overt, at other times concealed. It comprises an intense 
false propaganda, frequent acts of sabotage, terrorism and guerilla 
warfare, incessant infiltration by troops in disguise and by trained 
cadres, and the secret importation of arms and war material. 

On the political plane a so-called « Front for the Liberation 
of the South » was invented in order to give the impression of 
the existence of a movement of national liberation and to conceal 
more easily North Viet-Nam's direct participation in the aggression. 

It is under cover of this fictitious Front that the Communist 
elements carry out their aggressive and subversive activities in 
South Viet-Nam. Day and night they sow fear and insecurity in 
the rural areas, indiscriminately attack the civil population and 
the security forces, systematically sabotage charitable institutions, 
projects of economic and social development, places of religious 
worship, schools and hospitals. 

A number of criminal attacks have been made on the lives 
of members of the International Control Commission in Viet-Nam 
and against educational and medical centres sponsored by the 
United Nations. 

Moreover the forces of the so-called « Front for the Libera- 
tion of the South », using its secret bases in South Viet-Nam, 

fights a perpetual guerilla war against the army of the Republic 
of Viet-Nam. On occasions this war has been waged openly by 
whole battalions of regular Viet-Cong troops armed with the most 
modern weapons such as recoilless 75 mm guns, 7.92 mm. Maxim 
anti-aircraft guns. 

In the demilitarized zone at the 17th parallel the Hanoi 
authorities are constantly indulging in repeated acts of provo- 
cation, thus creating a lasting tension and endangering peace in 
this zone. 

Many military installations have been constructed illegally 
along this temporary military demarcation line in the northern 
demilitarized zone ; these serve as staging camps on the in- 
filtration routes leading to South Viet-Nam and as bases for any 
future invasion of South Viet-Nam. 

All these activities are in direct contravention of the 1954 
Geneva cease-fire agreement. 

They are aimed at extending the Communist grasp to the 
rest of Viet-Nam — a first step in the seizure of the whole of 
South-East Asia with its vast resources, in pursuit of the Com- 
munist plan of expansion throughout the world. 

Meddling by the Communist countries 

Far more serious is the moral and material support consistently 
and openly supplied by the other Communist countries to North 
Viet-Nam in its campaign of aggression and many-sided sub- 
version against free Viet-Nam. 

This foreign intervention constitutes an unwarranted inter- 
ference in the internal affairs of the nation — a serious violation 
of the letter and the spirit of the Geneva Agreement and of the 
United Nations Charter. 

It is particularly the aid from Communist China that has 
daily increased the murderous violence of this aggression. 

Evidence exists that considerable sums of money, large 
amounts of arms and equipment of every kind are sent secretly 
from the Communist countries to South Viet-Nam where they 
supply and equip the forces of the so-called « Front for the Libera- 
tion of the South ». The governments of the Communist countries 
have frequently acknowledged publicly the existence of this aid. 

General Liang-Pi-Yeh, Deputy Director of the Political Branch 
of the Chinese Army, clearly stated in Hanoi on May 5th, 1984 
that, what he called the oppressed nations and peoples «must 
reckon with armed struggle to assure victory in their revolution... 
We support whole-heartedly the armed struggle of the people of 
South Viet-Nam. » 


M '66 

The Peking Government gives tangible proof of its aggressive 
policies by supplying increasing quantities of the latest types of 
heavy arms made in Communist China, arms such as the 75 mm 
recoilless guns, 90 mm anti-tank bazookas, 7.92 mm heavy machine 
guns for anti-aircraft use and 7.62 mm machine guns. These 
weapons have greatly increased the fire power of the Communist 
troops in South Viet-Nam. 

The documents published in the annex to this White Book 
give proof of the scale and variety of the assistance supplied by 
North Viet-Nam and the other Communist regimes to the 
so-called « Front for the Liberation of the South ». 

This outside assistance has of late grown to such proportions 
that subversive activity in the form of guerilla warfare has now 
in fact become a war of aggression supplied overtly from outside. 

The international verdict 

The International Control Commission for Viet-Nam in its 
Special Report of June 2nd, 1962 to the Co-Chairman of the Geneva 
Conference adopted the following findings of its Legal Committee : 

1. « Having examined the complaints and the supporting 
material sent by the South Vietnamese Mission, the Committee 
has come to the conclusion that in specific instances there is 
evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, 
munitions and other supplies have been sent from the Zone in 
the North to the Zone in the South with the object of supporting, 
Organising and carrying out hostile activities, including armed 
attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and Administration 
of the Zone in the South. These acts are in violation of Articles 
10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities 
in Viet-Nam. » 

2. « In examining the complaints and the supporting material, 
in particular documentary material sent by the South Vietnamese 
Mission, the Committee has come to the further conclusion that 
there is evidence to show that the People's Army of Viet-Nam 
has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, en- 
couraging and supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the 
South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administration in the 
South. The use of the Zone in the North for such activities is in 
violation of Articles 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the 
Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam. » 

(Special Report of the International Commission for Super- 
vision and Control in Viet-Nam, June 2nd, 1962, page 7). 

This authoritative and irrefutable verdict represents a solemn 
condemnation of the North Vietnamese Communist regime for its 



subversive activities directed against the Republic of Viet-Nam. 
It is a legal verdict of incontestable validity which has had 
considerable international repercussions despite fruitless North 
Vietnamese denials. 

No nation which values peace should in future remain indif- 
ferent to the universal danger of Communist aggression. 

Thus the final communique of the South East Asia Treaty 
Organisation Conference issued in Manila on April 15th, 1964 
recognized that substantiated and documentary evidence exists to 
prove that the campaign organized against the Republic of Viet- 
Nam is « directed, supplied and supported by the Communist re- 
gime in North Viet-Nam, in flagrant violation of the Geneva, 
Accords of 1954 and 1962 » and that « the defeat of the Communist 
campaign is essential, not only to the security of the Republic of 
Viet-Nam, but to that of South-East Asia. » 

The Viet-Cong — Enemies of the people 

Despite this international condemnation, the Communists in 
Hanoi continue to pursue their policy of aggression, thus prolong- 
ing the war in South- Vietnam. By so doing they reveal themselves 
to be virtually the enemies of the Vietnamese people, subserviently 
carrying out Peking's warlike, expansionist policies. 

Moreover, the " campaign managers " in Hanoi have no longer 
the convenient excuse of fighting a " liberation war " ; on Nov- 
ember 1st, 1963, the South Vietnamese people were delivered 
from the tyranny of the former regime — a revolution which 
paved the way for a period of freedom and true democracy in 
accordance with deep, popular desires. Hanoi's propaganda also 
alleges that the war is in fact caused by American intervention 
— an allegation which is utterly groundless. 

The verdict of the International Control Commission is con- 
clusive on this subject. It has established beyond doubt the 
responsibility of the totalitarian Communist imperialism of North- 
Vietnam for the subversion and aggression undertaken against 
the Republic of Viet-Nam, whose Government has been obliged 
to seek help from friendly powers to deal with it. 

This invaluable moral and material aid from the government 
and people of the United States of America has no other aim than 
to help Viet-Nam preserve its independence and freedom. The 
Vietnamese Government has on many occasions solemnly declared 
that, as soon as Communist aggression ceases in Viet-Nam, it will 
be the first to request the cessation of American military aid. 

In its letter of December 9th, 1961, to the International Control 
Commission the Vietnamese Government emphasized the tern- 

porary and purely defensive nature of the aid which it had been 
obliged to request in exercising its legitimate right of self-defence 
as recognized by international law and enshrined in the United 
Nations Charter. 

The Prime Minister of Great Britain, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 
speaking in his capacity as co-chairman of the Geneva Conference, 
emphasized to the British House of Commons on April 18th, 1964, 
that the American involvement in South- Vietnam was neither an 
interference in the country's internal affairs nor a contravention 
of the 1954 Geneva Agreement. It was taking place at the request 
of the Vietnamese Government and was aimed at repulsing Com- 
munist subversion originating from North-Vietnam. 

It is clear that the Hanoi authorities alone are responsible for 
the tension and continuing state of war in South- Vietnam. It is 
therefore up to them alone to re-establish the peace which they 
have violated.. It is they who must stop their campaign of aggres- 
sion and subversion directed at the Republic of Viet-Nam, and 
pursued in spite of the ceasefire decreed by the Geneva Agree- 
ment ; it is they who must withdraw their armed forces, their 
trained cadres and their arms from South-Vietnamese soil. 

The Government of South-Vietnam is resolute 

The Government of South- Vietnam, for its part, is fully aware 
of its task and its just cause in fighting for the survival of Viet- 
Nam and the safeguarding of world peace and freedom against 
Communist imperialism. 

It is also well aware of the immense difficulties to be overcome 
in the bitter struggle against a formidable and perfidious Com- 
munist enemy, whose aggression has been planned well in advance 
— an enemy skilled at exploiting dissensions between States, who, 
by countless machiavellian manoeuvres, is constantly manipulating 
and distorting the truth. 

While maintaining their military pressure on South- Vietnam, 
the Hanoi authorities are at present making desperate efforts to 
push through the political aims of their expansionist plan. 

They are actively attempting to present the so-called « Front 
for the Liberation of the South » to world public opinion as the 
legitimate representative of South- Vietnam when in reality it is 
well-known to be a fictitious organization set up on paper by the 
Communist Lao-Dong Party in October 1960 purely for its own 

Moreover the Communist countries are deploying their entire 
propaganda machine in order to push through a systematic 
campaign of defamation directed against the Republic of Viet-Nam 


and the government of the United States of America. This cam- 
paign aims to confuse international opinion not only as to the 
true situation in Viet-Nam but concerning the disinterested nature 
of American aid. These manoeuvres are designed both to discourage 
and sow doubts in the minds of the American people in their 
commitment to fight for the preservation of freedom in South- 
East Asia and to win acceptance for a neutralist solution for South- 
Vietnam. By proposing the neutralization of South- Vietnam the 
Communist imperialists seek nothing less than to exploit to their 
own advantage in Viet-Nam their profitable experience in Laos. 

It is with the utmost vigour that the Government of the 
Republic of Viet-Nam denounces these treacherous Communist 
manoeuvres The Government rejects categorically a bogus 
neutralist solution for South- Vietnam since this would aim at 
transforming it rapidly into a Communist State. It emphasizes 
that none of the activities of the so-called « Front for the Libera- 
tion of the South* because it is a mere Communist invention, 
are in conformity with the will of the Vietnamese people. 

The Vietnamese Government solemnly restates its determi- 
nation to fight Communist aggression with every force at its 
disposal until the aim has been attained of preserving the in- 
dependence and freedom of the 14 million Vietnamese living south 
of the 17th parallel. 

It is convinced of the justice of the cause which it defends 
because it does not stand alone in this long and arduous battle 
against Communist imperialism ; it is supported constantly, both 
morally and materially, by an ever-increasing number of friendly 

The Vietnamese people are deeply grateful to the peoples of 
all those nations, especially the United States, who are aiding 
them unconditionally in this hour of crisis in their history. Their 
aid is of inestimable value and is marked by the supreme sacrifice 
of all those men who, in defending the standard of freedom, 
have fallen on the field of battle. In this common battle the 
effective and selfless support of friendly peoples is an immense 
encouragement to the Vietnamese people in their own efforts to 
fight Communism in this, the final battle in Asia — the battle to 
preserve its own independence and the freedom of the peoples of 
the world. 

It is with the aim of seeing peace and freedom triumph in 
this area of the world that the government of the Republic of 
Viet-Nam offers this White Book. It contains documents of un- 
impeachable authenticity illustrating the war-like and expansionist 
aims of Communist imperialism in the world. 





a) Overthrowing the legal government of South Viet-Nam 

1. Resolution of the Third Congress of the Lao-Dong Party, 

September 5th to 10th, 1960. 

«T?ie immediate task of the revolution in the South is to 
overthrow the dictatorial clique now in power in South Viei- 
Nam and to set-up a democratic government of national coalition 
in South Viet-Nam. » 

(Nhan Dan No. 2379, September 23rd, 1960 — official daily of 
the Lao-Dong Party). 

2. Statement by Truong-Chinh, member of the Poliburo of the 

Central Committee of the Lao-Dong Party : 

« The aim of this struggle is to destroy the Government of 
the South by means of the National Liberation Front and to 
install in its place a democratic government. » 

(Hoc-Tap, August 1961 ; official monthly organ of the Lao- 
Dong Party). 

3. Resolution of the Fifth Congress of the Fatherland Front of 

North Viet-Nam (controlled by the Lao-Dong Party) March 
18th to 20th, 1963 : 

« To mobilise the entire population for this struggle against 
the Americans and the South Vietnamese authorities ; to step-up 
the movement of solidarity between North and South with the 
aim of liberating South Viet-Nam. » 

1 — 

How are the Lao-Dong Party 
instructions carried out ? 

Some instances : 

1. Setting-up of the National Front for the Liberation of South 
Viet-Nam (N.F.L.S.V.) in 1960. 

Document found on the body of a Viet-Cong cadre on the 
Ban-Me-Thuot front on August 16th, 1961, containing written 
instructions, dated January 26th, 1961 : 

«In implimentation of the decision of the Third Congress 
of the Lao-Dong Party, the N.F.L.S.V. was setup to unify the 
revolutionary struggle, to overthrow the U.S.-Diem regime, to 
establish a popular government of democratic union and bring 
about the peaceful reunification of the country. The revolution 
for the liberation of the South would never succeed if the Party 
(i.e. the Lao-Dong Party) were not directing it. » 

2. Setting-up of the « People's Revolutionary Party » (P.R.P.) 
in December 1961. 

Broadcast by Hanoi Radio, January 19th, 1962 : 

«The Conference of the South Vietnamese delegates trained 
in the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, meeting at the end of December 
1961, decided to set-up the P.R.P. of South Viet-Nam and approved 
the party's program of action. The immediate aim of the new 
party is to unify and direct the workers, peasants and all South 
Vietnamese compatriots in the struggle to overthrow imperialism 
and feudalism represented at present by the U.S.A. and the 
Ngo-dinh-Diem clique of American stooges, and to liberate South 
Viet-Nam and form a democratic government of broad national 
union. » 

— 12 

b) North Viet -Nam's Support for the « Front 
for the Liberation of the South » 

1. Directives of the Lao-Dong Party : 

« Our southern compatriots in their struggle must not only 
rely on their own strength but can also count on the active 
support of North Viet-Nam and the socialist countries. » 

(Hoc-Tap, January 1963). 

2. Statement by Nguyen-chi-Thanh, Commander-in-Chief of the 

people's militia of North Viet-Nam : 

« We have appealed to the South Vietnamese people to reject 
Diem, to fight the Americans, to reject peaceful co-existence with 
the U .S ,-Diemists and to pursue the Revolution without respite. 
We believe that the building of a powerful North Viet-Nam and 
the revolutionary movement of the South Vietnamese people are 
two closely interconnected factors which complement each other. 
The entire people of North Viet-Nam and of the socialist camp 
stand shoulder to shoulder with the southern people ; for them 
the Revolution in the South is their revolution ; it is the common 
cause of world revolution. » 

(Hop-Tap, July 1963) . 

3. Statement by Ton-duc-Thang, chairman 
Front : 

of the Fatherland 

« We are firmly convinced that the peoples of the world will 
continue to step-up their moral and material aid to the people of 
South Viet-Nam ». 

(At a conference in Hanoi, October 20th to 23rd, 1963). 


Evidence of this support 

Activities and demonstrations in North Viet-Nam on behalf 
of the N.F.L.S.V. on the occasion of the 3rd anniversary of the 
setting-up of the so-called « Front » (December 20th 1963) . 

1. Appeal issued on October 2nd, 1963, urging the inhabitants 
of the North to aid their southern compatriots : 

« We appeal to all compatriots to understand more fully their 
responsibility as Northerners towards the revolutionary struggle 
in the South. » 

2. A resolution passed by a conference held in Hanoi from 
October 20th to 23rd, 1963, and attended by Communist organisa- 
tions from various countries, established December 20th, 1963, as 
the « Day of Solidarity of the Workers and People of the World 
with those of South Viet-Nam. » 

3. Week of Struggle (December 15th to 22nd, 1963) against 
the American Imperialists and for the stepping-up of production 
in support of the southern compatriots, organised by the Central 
Committee of the Fatherland Front. 

4. Every person (cadres, officials, military personnel, peasants 
and workers) is obliged to surrender one day's pay per month as 
a contribution to funds designed to finance the struggle against 
South Viet-Nam. 

5. Contributions demanded from the population : according 
to Radio Hanoi on December 30th, 1963, these exceed one million 
« Dong », the equivalent of 2,500 tons of rice. 

6. Delegations of the « Liberation Front », equipped with 
passports issued by the Hanoi authorities, have been sent to various 
Communist countries in search of aid (cf. letter No. 776 of February 
27th, 1964 from the Vietnamese Liaison Mission to the International 
Control Commission, at Annex No. 4). 

tf%f tJ i *.*•* 


Statement by Liu-Shao-Chi, President 
of the People's Republic of China in 
Hanoi on May 8th, 1963 : 

« The Chinese people have decided 
to support unswervingly the patriotic 
struggle of the people of South Viet- 
Nam... The Chinese people resolutely 
support the entire Vietnamese people 
in their sacred struggle ». 

Statement by Le-Duan, First Secretary 
of the Central Committee of the Lao- 
Dong Party, at a meeting of the Party 
Central Committee in December 1963 : 

« China has consistently aided our 
people during the building of socialism 
in the North ; she has warmly supported 
the revolutionary fight of our com- 
patriots in the South. » 

Evidence of Bid and support from communist countries 

1. Radio Peking, in a broadcast on February 17th, 1964, quoting 
a resolution of support for the so-called « Front for the Liberation 
of the South », put by Chien-ta-Wei, head of the Communist 
Chinese delegation, on February 13th, 1964 in Budapest to an 
international Communist meeting for so-called « student solidarity 
with the people and students of South Viet-Nam » : 

« To mobilise the students of every land to supply to the 
students of South Viet-Nam substantial and material aid, including 
arms. » 

(cf. Letter No. 1017 of March 13th 1964 from the Vietnamese 
Liaison Mission to the International Control Commission at Annex 
No. 5) . 

2. «... the Communist aggression of South Viet-Nam receives 
ever-increasing external support, in the form of armaments and 
war material, funds and technicians, from the Communist coun- 
tries, particularly Communist China. » 

(cf. Letter No. 2072 of June 2nd, 1964, from the Vietnamese 
Liaison Mission to the International Control Commission at Annex 
No. 9). 

3. Broadcast from Radio Hanoi of December 24th, 1963, con- 
cerning aid from the Communist countries to the so-called « Front 
for the Liberation of the South » : 

« East Germany has supplied goods and medicines worth 
320,000 marks ; Hungary and Mongolia respectively 100,000 forints 
and 170,000 tughniks worth of medicines each. Other countries of 
the Communist bloc have also offered or promised material and 
financial aid, » 

(cf. Letter No. 0776 of February 27, 1964 from the Vietnamese 
Liaison Mission to the International Control Commission at Annex 
No. 4) . 



11 The Establishing of Bases in North 
and in South Viet-Nam 

— Article 18 of the Agreement on the 
Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam : 

« With effect from the date of entry 
into force of the present Agreement, 
the establishment of new military bases 
is prohibited throughout Viet-Nam 
territory ». 

— Mao-Tse-Tung on Strategy : 

« Guerrilla bases are strategic bases 
for the sustaining of guerrilla warfare 
with its strategic task of supplying and 
reinforcing its own forces and of repuls- 
ing and destroying the enemy. 

« Fighting with no rear areas is one 
of the peculiarities of this type of guer- 
rilla... This war could not continue nor 
develop without a base. These bases 
serve as rear areas for the guerilla ». 

Su-That {Truth) Edition Hanoi, 1950. 

17 — 

Specific instances of armed subversion 

a) Military Bases in North Viet-Nam : 

New military bases have been established, thanks to Sino- 
Soviet aid : 

— The military base of Ho-Xa, 3 miles from the northern 
demilitarized zone : one airfield and 11 heavy artillery and 
anti-aircraft gun positions. 

— The military base of Con-Co, on Tiger Island. 

— The completely modernised naval base of Haiphong, whose 
capacity has been trebled with direct access opened to 

— Air bases at Gia-Lam, Cat-Bi, Huu-Cung, Vinh, Ha-Co, Na-San, 

A great many Soviet and Chinese military technicians, using 
their own supplies of material, have helped the Communist au- 
thorities in Hanoi to build-up a navy and a military air force, 
neither of which they possessed in 1954. They have even served 
as instructors to the regular North Vietnamese army, particularly 
at the guerrilla warfare training camps at Xuan-Mai (Ha-Dong 
Province), Son-Tay, Ben-Quang, and Minh-Khai (Vinh-Linh) 
where armed units are formed before being sent to South Viet- 

b) Viet-Cong bases on the national territory : 

Communists from North Viet-Nam maintain secret transit, 
supply and training camps on the territory of the Republic of 
Viet-Nam, especially in frontier areas. 

Some of these secret Viet-Cong bases, destroyed in operations 
during the first months of 1964, include : 

— In March 1964. Destruction of the secret V.C. bases at 
Kim-Binh and Le-hong-Phong, during Operation «Binh-Lam 
II », mounted in the « Ara Salour » region (Binh-Thuan, Binh- 
Tuy, Lam-Dong Provinces) against the Cuu-Long V.C. battalion. 

— On April 5th, 1964. Destruction of the V.C. supply base « A.20 » 
established in the Morpang region during Operation « Binh-Tri » 
(Kontum Province). 

— On April 13 th, 1964. Destruction of the secret Viet-Cong base 
of Duong-Minh-Chau during Operation « Chinh-Nghia 29 and 
31 » moimted at Tay-Ninh against the 56th Viet-Cong regiment. 

— On April 27 th, 1964. In Quang-Ngai Province, during Operation 
« Quyet-Thang 202 », destruction of the important Viet-Cong 
base of Do-Xa, in which the Headquarters of the Viet-Cong 
Interzone 5 was concealed. 

(cf, Annex Nos. 12, 13, 14 and 15). 


2. Fresh Outbreak of Hostilities 
in South Viet-Nam 

Article 11, paragraph 3, of the Agre- 
ement on the Cessation of Hostilities in 
Viet-Nam : 

a From such time as the cease-fire 
becomes effective in Northern Viet- 
Nam, both parties undertake not to 
engage in any large-scale offensive act- 
ion in any part of the Indo-Chinese 
theatre of operations... ». 

Instructions from Hanoi to launch a 
general offensive against the army of 
the Republic of Viet-Nam : 

« The Central Committee of the Lao- 
Dong Party, through the intermediary 
of its delegate for South Viet-Nam, 
has ordered the revolutionary forces 
throughout the southern region to 
launch a general offensive and to strike 
rapidly and hard in order to keep pace 
with developments in Laos and else- 
where in South-East Asia. Instructions 
from the Central Committee are to sever 
the enemy supply lines and disrupt 
their communications. Then it will be 
easier to annihilate them and seize 
power ». 

(Broadcast by the Voice of the 
« National Liberation Front of South 
Viet-Nam », July 6th 1961). 


Some instances 

The Viet-Cong (V.C.) forces continue to launch large-scale 
attacks against military installations, centres of administration, 
hamlets and villages in South Viet-Nam. Considerable forces have 
been deployed for these attacks, sometimes exceeding several 
regular battalions at once ; they are armed with modern weapons 
supplied by the Communist countries and far in excess of normal 
guerrilla equipment. Some typical cases are : 


— January 11th, 1964. An ambush laid at Khe-Chua, Thuy-Ban 
village in Quang-Tri Province for a South Vietnamese civil 
police patrol from Ben-Hai. 

— March 18th, 1964. An ambush laid in the vicinity of Ba-Tri, 
Kien-Tuong Province in the Mekong Delta, for a government 
army unit engaged in re-stocking an outpost. 

— May 3rd, 1964. Ambush laid on National Highway No. 1 between 
Hue and Quang-Tri for an International Control Commission 
jeep returning from a visit to Phu-Bai. 


— Company-size attacks 

— July 24th, 1964. Attack on Suoi-Kiet strategic hamlet in 
Binh-Tuy Province ; 3 V.C. companies deployed. 

— August 21st, 1963. Attack on an outpost and three strategic 
hamlets near Duc-Hiep, Quang-Tin Province ; 3 V.C. com- 
panies deployed. 

— November 24th, 1963. Attack on the Hiep-Hoa training centre 
in Due-Hue district of Hau-Nghia Province ; 3 V.C. com- 
panies deployed. 

— Battalion-size attacks 

— July 21st, 1963. Attack on the capital of Kien-Thien district 
and on Ninh-Hoa outpost, south-east of Kien-Thien in 
Chuong-Thien Province ; 2 V.C. battalions deployed. 

— August 31st, 1963. Contact made with Viet-Cong battalions 
No. 90, 80, 25, 95 and artillery battalion No. 300 in the Dai- 
Loc area, south of the provincial capital of Quang-Ngai ; 5 
V.C. battalions deployed. 

— November 4th, 1963. Attack on the Civil Guard post at Ba- 
Cung (An-Giang Province) ; 2 V.C. battalions deployed. 

— January 17th, 1964. Contact made with Viet-Cong battalions 
536 and « Cuu-Long », during Operation « Phuong-Hoang I » 
in Kien-Hoa Province ; 2 V.C. battalions deployed. 

(cf. Annex Nos. 12, 13, 14 and 15). 


3. Illegal infiltration into South Viet-Nam of 
arms and war material of communist origin. 

a) Article 17, paragraph (a) of the Agreement 
on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam : 

« With effect from the date of entry into 
force the present Agreement, the introduc- 
tion into Viet-Nam of any reinforcements in 
the form of all types of arms, munitions and 
other war material... is prohibited ». 

b) « ... The list of arms, war material and equip- 
ment seized from the Viet-Cong is firm 
evidence of the direction by the Communist 
authorities in Hanoi, assisted by the other 
Communist countries, especially China, of 
the campaign of aggression and subversion 
against the Republic of Viet-Nam ». 

(Extract from letter No. 0370 of January 
29th, 1964 from the Vietnamese Liaison 
Mission to the International Control Com- 
mission) . 


Selected evidence 

The principal Communist arms and munitions seized in South 
Viet-Nam between June 2nd, 1963 and the end of April 1964. The 
list is still incomplete : 

1. Of Communist Chinese origin; 

— 75 mm and 57 mm recoilless rifles 6 

— Ammunition for 75 mm and 57 mm rifles, rounds. 283 

— 80 mm and 60 mm mortars 3 

— Bombs for 60 mm mortars 183 

— 90 mm Bazookas 1 

— P. 38 automatic pistols 1 

— Rifles 2 

— Sub-machine guns 2 

— 7.92 Maxim 08 machine guns 6 

— 7.62 light machine guns ■ - ■ 2 

— Ignition fuses for 60 mm mortar bombs 150 

— MP.82 fuses 142 

— 27 mm grenade throwers 3 

— 7.92 machine gun ammunition, rounds 100,000 

2. Of Soviet origin : 

— Mossin Nagant carbines 15 

— Rifles I 68 

— Automatic pistols 1 

— Grenades 5 

— Rifle ammunition, rounds 160,000 

— Sub-machine guns 6 

3. Of Czech origin ; 

— 7.62 K.50 sub-machine guns 52 

— Rifles 42 

— Light machine guns 4 

— Sub-machine gun ammunition, rounds 14,000 

— Grenade throwers 1 

— 3.5 mm anti-tank rockets 1 

— 60 mm mortars 1 

4. Arms and ammunition modified by the North Vietnamese Army; 

— Modified MAT.49 pistols 24 

— 12.7 mm machine guns 2 

(cf . Annex Nos. 12, 13, 14 and 15) . 

_ 22 — 

4. Illegal incursion into South Viet-Nam of 

cadres specially trained in North Viet-Nam 

and of regular units of the North Vietnamese 

communist army. 

Article 27 of the Geneva Agreement : 

« The signatories of the present Agreement 
and their successors in their functions shall 
be responsible for ensuring the observance 
and enforcement of the terms and provisions 
thereof. The Commanders of the Forces of the 
two parties shall, within their respective com- 
mands, take all steps and make all arrange- 
ments necessary to ensure full compliance 
with all the provisions of the present Agree- 
ment by all elements and military personnel 
under their command. 

« The procedures laid down in the present 
Agreement shall, whenever necessary, be 
studied by the Commanders of the two 
parties, and, if necessary, defined more 
specifically by the Joint Commission ». 


Evidence of infiltration by cadres and military 
personnel from North Viet-Nam 

Instances are : 

The case of one Tran-ngoc-Son, leader of a Viet-Cong guerrilla 
section, captured on December 27th, 1962, in Zone D (Phuoc- 
Thanh Province) by government forces. 

Training in North Viet-Nam. At the Thuong-Tin Training Centre 
(Ha-Dong Province, North Viet-Nam) underwent a special 
course of political and military training for cadres due to be 
sent to South Viet-Nam ; special training was provided in 
sabotage and espionage activities and in guerrilla warfare. 

Infiltration Route. On April 2nd, 1962, Tran-ngoe-Son's group, 
comprising 102 trained personnel organised into 3 sections, 
left in 4 Molotova trucks in a southerly direction as far as 
Dong-Hoi. On April 12th, 1962, the group forded the river 
Ben-Hai at the western extremity of the demilitarized zone, 
entered Laotian territory and continued its march along paths 
adjacent to the Laotian-South Vietnamese frontier. On April 
27th the group entered Thua-Thien Province (South Viet-Nam) 
and left there 24 trained men. The remainder reached Quang- 
Nam Province on April 28th and Kontum on May 4th where 
they left behind 44 trained personnel. The remaining 32 men 
were in Pleiku Province on May 29th, then, travelling on 
Highway 19, they entered Cambodian territory, and moved 
from there towards War Zone D. 

The case of 2nd Lieutenant Tran-dat-On, who surrendered to the 
Tay-Ninh provincial authorities on March 18th, 1963. 

Infiltration Route. Left the Xuan-Mai Training Centre (North 
Viet-Nam) on February 7th, 1962. Together with his No. 18 
V.C. Company, he arrived on Laotian soil on February 10th. 
In March he reached War Zone D and thence central South 

Activities. No. 18 Company was defeated at Due-Hue in July 1962 
and then re-formed into two companies. Tran-dat-On was 
promoted Section Leader of No. 1 section of C. 286 Heavy 
Weapons Company. In January 1963 he was ordered to Binh- 
Hoa-Thon to conduct a contingent of recruits to the Duong- 
Minh-Chau secret base. He deserted and reported to the Bau- 
Co outpost on March 18th, 1963. 

(Cf. Annex Nos. 16 and 17). 

— 24 — 


Illegal incursion into South Viet-Natn 

of cadres trained in North Viet-Nam and 

of regular units of the North Vietnamese 

communist army (Contd.) 

Truong-Chinh, member of the Polit- 
buro of the Central Committee of the 
Lao-Dong Party and Party theoretician ; 
from his book «The Resistance Will 
Win », Chapter 9, published 1947, Eng- 
lish edition 1960. 

*ln these regions (the Mekong Delta 
and the coastal plain of Central Viet- 
Nam) experience has taught us that, to 
avoid disintegration, our troops should 
quickly abandon their uniforms, com- 
bine with the people, distribute a part 
of their arms to them, organise militia 
forces, arm the entire people.,, ». 

Statement by Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 
British Prime Minister, in the House of 
Commons, February 20th 1964 : 

«Not only is there very serious infil- 
tration into South Viet-Nam from North 
Viet-Nam, but also there is increasingly 
serious infiltration from North Viet- 
Nam into Laos », 

Further examples of infiltration 

The case of 2nd Lieutenant Nguyen-hong-Thai, who surrendered to 
the Son-Ha district authorities in Quang-Ngai Province on September 
14th, 1963. 

— Information supplied. 

1. He had been taught a tactic known as " internal subversive 
warfare ". An official body, headed by Le-Duan, First Secretary 
of the Lao-Dong Party, had been set-up to develop this type of 

2. Hanoi reckoned to be in a position to assure support for these 
subversive activities over a period of 7 to 15 years. The plan 
forsees first of all the conquest of the provinces of Kontum, 
Binh-Dinh, Quang-Ngai and part of Quang-Nam. 

The case of Captain Nguyen-van-Do, who surrendered on October 23rd, 
1963, at Ben-Don, in Darlac Province. 

— Background. Underwent a course at the Infantry Officers Training 
School at Son-Tay (North Viet-Nam), at which Major Tran-ngoc- 
Dan, who surrendered on February 11th, 1963, had been an 
instructor. Transferred to No. 338 Regiment, he was put in charge 
of training at Xuan-Mai Camp of No. 406 Group (also known as 
H.26) made up of 124 artillerymen, ranging from company sergeant- 
major to captain, all due to be sent South. 

— Infiltration Route. H.26 Group left Xuan-Mai on July 4th, 1963 
and passed through Vinh-Linh, Ha-Tinh, Dong-Hoi, before reaching 
Quang-Tri. It crossed the river Ben-Hai and entered Thua-Thien 
Province (South Viet-Nam) , continuing its trek on Laotian territory 
before re-entering South Viet-Nam in Quang-Nam Province ; the 
river Sr6pok was reached on October 15th, 1963, after travelling 
along the frontiers with Laos and Cambodia. 

- The case of Captain Tran-xuan-Vy, captured at Tay-Ninh on December 
29th, 1963. 

— Training in North Viet-Nam,. Attended a course of military and 
political training at the Xuan-Mai Training Camp, in Ha-Dong 
Province (North Viet-Nam). 

— Infiltration Route. Left the Xuan-Mai Training Camp for Ha-Tinh 
on June 6th, 1961, travelling by military vehicle along Highway 
No. 1. 

— Entered Laos on Highway No. 12. Trekked for ten days on 
Laotian soil, using mountain tracks, before reaching the town 
of Tchepone. 

— Entered South Viet-Nam at Quang-Nam Province. 

— After 111 days on the move,, reached the Viet-Cong Zone D 
(Phuoc-Thanh Province) on June 27th, 1961. 

— Activities. Posted to the political section of Viet-Cong Regiment 
No. C.56 in order to train cadres in psychological warfare and 
counter- espion age . 

(cf. Annex Nos. 17, 18 and 20). 

— 26 — 

5. Violation by the Viet-Cong 

of the statute relating to the 

demilitarized Zone. 

The Geneva Agreement of 1954 on the 
cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam 
— the Demilitarized Zone. 

Article 5 : «To avoid any incidents 
which might result in the resumption 
of hostilities, all military forces, sup- 
plies and equipment shall be withdrawn 
from the demilitarized zone within 
twenty-five (25) days of the present 
Agreement's entry into force ». 

Article 6 : « No person, military or 
civilian, shall be permitted to cross the 
provisional military demarcation line 
unless specifically authorised to do so 
by the Joint Commission ». 

Article 7 : « No person, military or 
civilian, shall be permitted to enter the 
demilitarized zone except persons con- 
cerned with the conduct of civil 
administration and relief and persons 
specifically authorised to enter by the 
Joint Commission ». 

Some specific cases 

1. Summary of cases where the Statute relating to the 
Demilitarized Zone has been violated by North Viet-Nam. 







18 cases 



65 ( 



;ases 72 cases 












(See Graph) 








, . 824 cases 



2. One of the chief infiltration routes used by the North Viet- 
namese Communist authorities for the despatch of personnel and 
war material to South Viet-Nam passes through the mountainous 
region to the west of the Demilitarized Zone and through Laotian 

Between September 1962 and April 1963 two regiments and 
nine battalions of Viet-Cong regulars used this route to infiltrate 
into South Viet-Nam. 

3. In the Demilitarized Zone the military establishments and 
installations clearly aim to 

a) provide increased facilities for routing reinforcements of 
men, supplies and arms to the Communist forces in their 
war of aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam ; 

b) provide bases for attack within the Demilitarized Zone, 
as well as supply points on South Vietnamese soil in the 
eventuality of a direct invasion of or extensive operations 
against the Republic of Viet-Nam. 

These therefore constitute extremely serious violations of the 
Statute relating to the Demilitarized Zone as defined in the 
Geneva Agreement of 1954 on the cessation of hostilities in Viet- 

(Extract from letter No. 2832 of August 29th, 1963 from the 
Vietnamese Liaison Mission to the International Control Commis- 
sion, cf. Annex No. 22). 

— 28 — 


6. Communist atrocities and acts of 
terrorism in South Viet-Nam. 

The Geneva Agreement on the ces- 
sation of hostilities in Viet-Nam : 

Article 10 : « The Commanders of the 
Forces on each side, on the one side the 
Commander-in-Chief of the French 
Union forces in Indo-China and on the 
other side the Commander-in-Chief of 
the People's Army of Viet-Nam, shall 
order and enforce the complete cessa- 
tion of all hostilities in Viet-Nam by all 
armed forces under their control, in- 
cluding all units and personnel of the 
ground, naval and air forces », 

Article 19 : « ... The two parties shall 
ensure that the zones assigned to them 
do not adhere to any military alliance 
and are not used for the resumption of 
hostilities or to further an aggressive 
policy ». 

Article 24 : «... The armed forces of 
each party shall respect the demilit- 
arized zone and the territory under the 
military control of the other party ... »,. 

1. Summary of cases of victims of Viet-Cong terrorist acts during 1963 r 

— Persons assassinated : 

Civil population 1,558 

Local Officials 415 

Civil Servants 100 

— Persons injured 8,375 

— Persons kidnapped 7,262 


2. Communist atrocities and acts of terrorism in South Viet-Nam : 

Viet-Cong terrorists, masquerading under the guise of the so-called 
« Front for the Liberation of the South », continue their deliberate and 
indiscriminate attacks on the defenceless civil population and on places 
of social service. These occur daily and result in serious damage to public 
and private property ; they also cause a great number of innocent victims, 
including many women and children. Some specific instances are : 

Acts of terrorism : 

— The assassination of Mr. Tran-phuoc-Thanh by a band of armed Viet- 
Cong on the night of October 7th, 1963 at Khanh-Hoi hamlet (Kien- 
Hoa Province) . A written sentence of death was pinned to the victim's 

— The assassination by some twenty Viet-Cong of Mr. Ngo-Tien, aged 
58, a councillor of Phu-Hai hamlet (Thua-Thien Province) at about 
8.00 p.m. on January 19th, 1964, 400 yards from his house. A bill of 
indictment was also discovered on the victim's body. 

— The assassination of Mrs. Hoang-thi-Con and her 9 year-old daughter 
Truong-thi-Loi on the night of March 17th/18th, 1964 at Bach-Loc 
hamlet in the Trung-Luong district of Quang-Tri Province (Demilitariz- 
ed Zone) . The Viet-Cong had hacked the victims to death with knives. 

— Mr. Nguyen-phuoc-Dang from Phu-Thuan village in the Binh-Dai 
district of Kien-Hoa Province was decapitated by the Viet-Cong on 
the night of October lst/2nd, 1963. A written sentence of death was 
likewise pinned to the victim's body. 

Acts of Sabotage : 

— On April 27th, 1963 the UNESCO Basic Education Centre at Tan-An 
in Long-An Province was attacked. 

— On April 21st, 1964, the maternity clinic of Long-Hoa village in Long- 
An Province was destroyed and the medical supplies plundered. 

— On May 3rd, 1964 a civilian bus was blown up by a mine on the 
road between Nhon-Hoa and Moc-Hoa in Kien-Tuong Province. 14 per- 
sons, among them 2 children, were killed and 11 persons including 4 
children were injured. 

— On March 22nd, 1964 a bus operated by the Hiep-Huu Company hit 
an electrically-detonated Viet-Cong mine on the road between Tan- 
Tru and Long-An. A total of 22 passengers were killed, among whom 
were one pregnant woman and six children between the ages of 2 
and 5. 

(cf. Annex Nos. 23 to 34). 


1954-1964 The government of the 

Republic of Vietnam is more than 

ever determined to put an end to the 

danger of Communism which hangs 

heavily over the land. 

In spite of having to devote a 

large portion of its time and resources 

to the conduct of the war, the govern- 

ment has made important strides in 

different fields, — political, economic 

and social — with the aim of raising 

the people's standard of living and 

removing social inequalities. The go- 

vernment will shortly issue a further 

publication to illustrate the progress 

achieved in these different fields. 

Vmi; cases of the Statute oi the Demilitarized /.one 

by People's Ainiv of Vicl, N;un 

(UMia i !m;.-{ \\)M) 

Number oi' 
Violation cases 



1 LU 


105 1 





95 > 









78 S 

/ 78^ 

70 ' 





74 ' 





' 65 



1 42 










<( 18 


— 1963 

— 1964 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 

7,92 mm heavy machine-gun imitated from MG. 08 German model 

with water cooling and comprising a tripod for anti-aircraft 

shooting, made in Communist China, seized during the Operation 

« Dan-Chi 101 » at Chuong-Thien, on December 21 $t, 1963. 


15 mm recoilless cannon made in Communist China, imitated from 
M. 20 American model, seized during the Operation « Duc-Thang 60 
at Dinh-Tuong, on December 3rd, 1963. 

7,62 mm DPM Degtyarev air-cooling machine-gun, 1953 model, 

made in Communist China, imitated jrom Soviet-Russian model, 

seized at Ba-Da, Quang-Tri province, on April 26 th, 1964. 
































• i> 






















7,62 mm machine-gun, seized at Ba-Da on April 26 th, bearing 

the Communist Chinese trade-mark in Chinese 

characters on the breech-block. 

Photograph of a group of soldiers of the North Vietnamese 

regular army, found on the corpse of a Viet-cong soldier killed 

during an engagement at Ba-Da, Thua-Thien province. 

Words written at the back of the photograph : 

Ky niem 

Quang-Binh xuat phat 


which mean : Recollection of the leaving day from Quang-Binh 

February 5 th, 1964. 

60 mm mortar-shell, made in Communist China, seized during the 

Operation « Duc-Thang 35/42 », at Dam-Doi, An-Xuyen province, 

on September 10 th, 1963. 

Pharmaceutical products and surgical instruments 

made in Communist China, seized during an Operation at Darlac 

on March, 27 th, 1962. 

K. 50 sub-machine-gun made in Czechoslovakia, with air cooling, 

seized during the Operation « Dan-Thang 136 » at Quang-Ngai, 

on August 31 st, 1963. 

12,7 mm heavy machine-gun modified by the Viet-cong, equipped 

with telescopic sight of Soviet-Russian make, seized at Duc-Hoa, 

Long-An province, qn November, 24 th, 1963. 

MAT. 49 sub-machine-gun modijied by the Viet-cong, seized 

in a Viet-cong clandestine depot at Chu-Dleya, Phu-Bon province, 

on December 5 th, 1963. 

The Viet-cong terrorists sign their crimes : 

Helmet bearing the insignia of a yellow star on a red background of 

the Security Service of North Vietnam, left by the murderer 

of Mr. Tran-phu-Phuong, in charge of the Radio-broadcast Station 

of Xuan-My, killed in the Southern Demilitarized zone, 

on July, 27 th, 1963. 

Mr. Dao-hien-Kha of Long-Tri village, Long-My 

district, Phong-Dirih province, beheaded by Viet-cong 

terrorists, on June 4 th, 1961. 

Photograph of Mr. Hoang-Tuong of Triiu-Van village, Quang-Tri 

province, savagely murdered by Viet-cong terrorist agents on 

April, 9 th, 1964. 

The infirmary of My-Phuoc-Tay, Dinh-Tuong province, destroyed 
by Viet-cong terrorists on April 8 th, 1964. 

* - 

The maternity -hospital of My-Phuoc-Tay, Dinh-Tuong province, destroyed 
by Viet-Cong terrorists, on April 8 th, 1964. 

How the Viet-cong liberate the population of South-Vietnam : 

A woman and her child, among the 23 victims of the Viet-eong 

attack on March, 22 nd, 1964 against the Hiep-Huu motor-coach 

on the route Tan-Tru — Long-An. 

FrightlVy mangled corpse of a passenger 
of the Hiep-Huu bus.